Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-speech Standards Should Not Apply to Post-Secondary Students—Tatro V. University of Minnesota by Lindsay, Meggen
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 4 Article 5
2012
Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-
speech Standards Should Not Apply to Post-
Secondary Students—Tatro V. University of
Minnesota
Meggen Lindsay
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Lindsay, Meggen (2012) "Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-speech Standards Should Not Apply to Post-Secondary





TINKER GOES TO COLLEGE: WHY HIGH SCHOOL  
FREE-SPEECH STANDARDS SHOULD NOT               
APPLY TO POST-SECONDARY STUDENTS—                                
TATRO V. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 
Meggen Lindsay† 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1471 
 II. HISTORY OF STUDENT-SPEECH PROTECTIONS ..................... 1474 
 III. TATRO V. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA ..................................... 1478 
 IV. THE TINKER TEST SHOULD NOT APPLY TO PUBLIC 
UNIVERSITIES ....................................................................... 1480 
A. Tinker Invoked, But Not Applied .................................... 1480 
B. Differing Pedagogies ........................................................ 1481 
C. U.S. Supreme Court Precedents Protect College Speech ........ 1483 
D. Circuits Fractured; Third Circuit Decisions Get it Right .... 1484 
E. Tatro Fails to Recognize Crucial Distinctions Between 
Speech Protections at Primary and University Levels .......... 1487 
 V. ONLINE SPEECH LIKE TATRO’S IS PROTECTED SPEECH ....... 1488 
A. U.S. Supreme Court Has Not Ruled on Student Internet 
Speech Rights .................................................................. 1488 
B. Recent Case Law Concludes Online, Off-Campus Speech is 
Protected ......................................................................... 1489 
C. Cases That Have Upheld Restrictions of Online Speech are 
Inapposite to Tatro ......................................................... 1494 
D. Online Speech Restricted Where it Targeted School and 
Caused Actual Substantial Disruption ............................. 1496 
 VI. TATRO’S SPEECH DID NOT CAUSE A MATERIAL AND 
SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION................................................... 1501 
A. University Overreaction Caused Disruption, If There Was 
One, Not Tatro’s Speech ................................................... 1501 
B. Any Disruption on Campus Did Not Rise to Requisite 
Level .............................................................................. 1502 
 
       †  J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2014; M.S., 
Northwestern University, 2001; B.A., Miami University (Ohio), 2000.  The author 
would like to thank her husband for his endless reserves of patience, and Professor 
Raleigh Levine for her invaluable support and guidance on this topic.  
1
Lindsay: Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-speech Standards Sho
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
  
2012] TINKER GOES TO COLLEGE 1471 
 VII. TRUE-THREAT STANDARD MORE APPLICABLE THAN 
TINKER IN EVALUATING TATRO ............................................ 1506 
A. Adult Speech Should Be Evaluated Under a Higher 
Standard ........................................................................ 1506 
B. True Threats Must be Understood by Reasonable Person as 
Expressing Violent Intent ................................................. 1507 
C. Tatro’s Speech Does Not Qualify as a True Threat ............ 1509 
 VIII. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1510 
A. Offensive Speech is Protected Speech .................................. 1510 
B. Implications of Tatro for Student Speech ........................... 1512 
C. Minnesota Supreme Court Should Overturn Tatro ............ 1513 
 
I. INTRODUCTION   
In the age of the Internet, students’ free-speech rights are in 
peril.  Students still “talk” to one another, but they are just as likely 
to e-mail, text, instant message, blog, status update, and tweet their 
speech.1  And while students have caught up to the technology, the 
judiciary has not.  The U.S. Supreme Court has drawn clear lines 
for the First Amendment2 rights of secondary students while they 
physically are in classrooms, but so far it has failed to give 
cyberspeech the analysis and protection it requires.  In the absence 
of clear judicial standards for student speech that has increasingly 
moved online, this issue has emerged in the lower courts in the 
context of K-12 schools.3  In due time, the Supreme Court likely 
 
 1. According to a 2009 survey by the Pew Research Center, ninety-three 
percent of American teens use the Internet, with seventy-three percent using social 
networking sites like Facebook and Myspace, and thirty-seven percent sharing 
their own creations, like art, stories, or videos.  Trend Data For Teens, PEW INTERNET 
& AM. LIFE PROJECT, http://www.pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-for-Teens/Online-
Activites-Total.aspx (last updated May 2011).  The survey also found that seventy-
five percent of teens had a mobile phone, and sixty-nine percent owned laptop or 
personal computers.  Teen Gadget Ownership, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-for-Teens/Teen-Gadget-Ownership.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
 2. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 3. An Indiana federal district court judge noted that such issues are “ripe for 
disposition” in an August 2011 case regarding online student speech.  T.V. ex rel. 
B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-290-PPS, 2011 WL 3501698, at 
*1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2011).  The conflict that Chief Judge Simon sets up is 
typical of many of the controversies to be discussed: 
2
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will determine how far, if at all, a school’s jurisdiction extends to 
online student speech.  In 2011, the Court denied three writs of 
certiorari in online student-speech cases.4  Nevertheless, the 
increased scrutiny may perhaps raise the likelihood that the high 
court at some point will clarify how far a school’s authority extends 
to off-campus, online speech.   
A tension has arisen between protecting students’ freedom of 
speech and shielding schools from real and perceived threats of 
student violence.  This is particularly apparent against the deadly 
backdrop of the fatal shooting sprees at Virginia Tech,5 the Red 
Lake reservation,6 and Columbine High School.7  But in attempting 
to safeguard campuses, some courts and school administrators have 
overreached in their restriction of student speech, particularly 
when it is online and off-campus. 
This unfortunate tendency is illustrated in the recent decision 
of Tatro v. University of Minnesota,8 in which the Minnesota Court of 
 
The case poses timely questions about the limits school officials can place 
on out of school speech by students in the information age where 
Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, texts, and the like rule the day.  The school 
argues that they ought to be allowed to regulate this speech while the 
students claim that their First Amendment rights are being violated. 
Id. 
 4. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Doninger v. Niehoff, 
642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 5. On April 16, 2007, student Seung-Hui Cho opened fire in classrooms and 
a dormitory at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, killing thirty-two 
people and wounding twenty-five others before taking his own life; the massacre 
was the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history.  Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics 
/organizations/v/virginia_polytechnic_institute_and_state_university/index.html 
(last updated Mar. 14, 2012). 
 6. On March, 21, 2005, on the northern Minnesota Indian reservation of 
Red Lake, sixteen-year-old Jeff Weise shot his grandfather to death and then went 
to the high school, where he shot students and teachers at random.  What 
Happened at Red Lake?, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 2005), http://news.minnesota 
.publicradio.org/projects/2005/03/redlake/. Ten died and seven others were 
injured.  Id. 
 7. “On the morning of April 20, 1999, Eric Harris, 18, and Dylan Klebold, 
17, walked into Columbine High School, outside Denver, and shot to death 12 
fellow students and a teacher” before killing themselves.  Gina Lamb, Columbine 
High School, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics 
/organizations/c/columbine_high_school/index.html (last updated Apr. 17, 
2008).  “Their actions were the result of a yearlong plot that included plans to 
blow up the school and kill as many as 500 people.”  Id. 
 8. 800 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
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Appeals upheld the university’s discipline of a student for her 
online, off-campus speech.9  In Tatro, a three-judge panel10 of the 
appeals court held that school administrators did not violate the 
First Amendment rights of mortuary-science student Amanda Tatro 
when they disciplined her for her off-color Facebook status 
updates.11  Tatro’s Facebook comments, which she has claimed 
were satirical,12 referenced her desire to “stab a certain someone in 
the throat” with a cadaver lab instrument.13 
Tatro’s ruling represents an overly broad judicial reach and is 
troubling for student speech.  The decision allows school 
administrators far too much leeway in limiting student speech 
online.  Equally troubling, it also wrongly equates high school and 
university speech standards.  Fortunately, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court agreed in 2011 to take Tatro’s appeal, and heard oral 
arguments on February 8, 2012.  At the time of this writing, a 
decision in the case had not been published.  The state’s highest 
court should overturn this flawed decision.  If left to stand, Tatro’s 
disquieting logic could have a chilling effect on the freedom of 
student expression and could encourage post-secondary educators 
to treat speech that is merely critical as threatening. 
Part II of this article traces the history of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s analysis of students’ free-speech rights.14  Part III details 
Tatro’s controversial holding and reasoning.15  This article posits 
that the Minnesota Court of Appeals wrongly decided Tatro on four 
distinct grounds. 
Part IV examines the first of these four areas: the improper 
application of the so-called Tinker16 standard to a university 
setting.17  The Tinker standard allows school officials to sanction 
student speech if they reasonably conclude that the speech will 
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school.”18  This standard should be restricted to K–12 student 
speech, not extended to adults at the post-secondary level. 
 
 9. Id. at 813–14. 
 10. Judges Bjorkman, Halbrooks, and Hudson sat on the Court of Appeals 
panel. 
 11. Id. at 822–23. 
 12. Id. at 816. 
 13. Id. at 817. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
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Part V argues that even if Tinker were the proper lens through 
which to view Tatro, Tinker should not be applied to this type of off-
campus speech.19  Tatro’s online speech was off-campus speech that 
did not occur at a school-sponsored event, and as such, it amounts 
to protected conduct under the rubric of school-speech cases.  Part 
VI explains that even if Tinker should apply to college-level, off-
campus speech, the substantial-disruption standard was unmet.20  
The result of Tatro’s speech does not qualify as a “substantial 
disruption” under Tinker or its progeny.  Part VII discusses the final 
way that the court of appeals erred in its reasoning.21  The court 
should have applied the “true-threat” standard,22 instead of the 
Tinker standard, to determine if Tatro’s speech was protected.  The 
First Amendment does not shield true threats, but this article 
suggests that Tatro’s online comments clearly did not amount to 
true threats.  The Facebook posts, while in bad taste, could not 
reasonably have been seen as a true threat to a particular 
individual, or to her classmates more generally. 
Finally, Part VIII analyzes the potential ramifications of the 
decision for students in the age of social media, particularly in 
lowering the threshold for speech to “materially and substantially 
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”23  It then urges the 
Minnesota Supreme Court to overturn the appeals court’s ruling 
and safeguard student-speech protections.  
II. HISTORY OF STUDENT-SPEECH PROTECTIONS  
To properly analyze Tatro and the progeny of cases it purports 
to follow, it is critical to examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence around student speech.  In the tetralogy of student 
speech cases, there are two important ambiguities.  First, none of 
the cases involved college students, and the Court has not expressly 
extended its more deferential standards for high school speech 
restrictions to universities.  The second unaddressed issue is how 
far off campus, if at all, a school’s jurisdiction extends over student 
 
 19. See infra Part V. 
 20. See infra Part VI. 
 21. See infra Part VII. 
 22. Under a true-threat analysis, “statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals” are not protected 
under the First Amendment.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344, 359 (2003). 
 23. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513; see infra Part VIII. 
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speech. 
The seminal case on student speech came in 1969, with Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.24  The majority’s 
7-2 decision25 held that the First Amendment applied to students in 
public schools and that administrators would have to demonstrate 
constitutionally valid reasons for any specific regulation of speech 
in the classroom.26  The court affirmed: “It can hardly be argued 
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”27  But 
while the First Amendment conclusively protects the free-speech 
rights of students in school, those rights must be “applied in light 
of the special characteristics of the school environment.”28  The 
Tinker court held that “to justify prohibition of a particular 
expression of opinion,” school officials must prove that “the 
forbidden conduct would materially and substantially interfere with 
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school.”29  The Court determined that Des Moines junior and 
senior high students who wore black armbands to school in a silent, 
passive protest of the Vietnam War did not cause a substantial 
disruption to educational activities, and therefore, the students’ 
speech was protected.30  In order to justify the prohibition of an 
expression, the Court noted that “[school officials] must be able to 
show that [their] action was caused by something more than a 
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”31 
Lower courts have interpreted Tinker to mean that school 
authorities are not obligated to wait until an actual disruption 
occurs, but can regulate student expression if they can reasonably 
forecast that a disruption will occur.32  The Sixth Circuit noted that 
“[s]chool officials have an affirmative duty to not only ameliorate 
the harmful effects of disruptions, but to prevent them from 
 
 24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 25. Justice Abe Fortas authored the landmark Tinker opinion.  Id. 
 26. Id. at 511. 
 27. Id. at 506. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 509. 
 30. Id. at 508–09. 
 31. Id. at 509. 
 32. Id. at 514 (stating that speech cannot be restricted if the record fails to 
“demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to 
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities”). 
6
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happening in the first place.”33 
Tinker and its “substantial-disruption” test set the broad and 
general rule for when school speech may be regulated, and a trio of 
subsequent cases have whittled away at Tinker’s protection, carving 
out narrow exceptions to its test.  The first exception came in Bethel 
School District v. Fraser,34 which held that school officials are 
permitted to regulate “lewd,” “vulgar,” and “indecent” speech at 
school.35  The Court held that the discipline of Bethel High School 
student Matthew Fraser, who was suspended after giving a speech 
filled with sexual innuendos at a school assembly, did not violate 
the First Amendment.36  The Court determined that the rights of 
students “are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults 
in other settings” and that “[t]he determination of what manner of 
speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate 
properly rests with the school board.”37  By not employing the 
“substantial-disruption” test, Fraser established that “the mode of 
analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.”38 
The second exception to Tinker was addressed in Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, in which the Court held that school 
officials are allowed to impose reasonable restrictions on school-
sponsored publications.39  The Court determined that a Missouri 
high school principal who removed articles on divorce and teen 
pregnancy from a school-sponsored newspaper did not violate the 
First Amendment.40  “[E]ducators do not offend the First 
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and 
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities 
so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”41 
The final narrowing of Tinker came in Morse v. Frederick, where 
the issue was whether school administrators violated the free-
speech rights of Juneau-Douglas High School student Joseph 
Frederick.42  Frederick had displayed a banner that read “BONG 
 
 33. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 34. 478 U.S. 675, 683, 685 (1986). 
 35. Id. at 685. 
 36. Id. at 685–86. 
 37. Id. at 682–83. 
 38. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007). 
 39. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 40. Id. at 276. 
 41. Id. at 273. 
 42. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396. 
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HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-sanctioned and supervised event held 
across the street from the school during the 2002 Olympic Torch 
Relay.43  The Court held that “a principal may, consistent with the 
First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when 
that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”44  
The Court declined to apply the Tinker standard, noting that 
neither Hazelwood nor Frazer did.45  In concluding the speech was 
not protected, the Court noted the “serious and palpable” danger 
that drug use poses to the health and safety of students.46  While 
Frederick was off-campus, the Court emphasized that school events 
and field trips off school grounds were subject to the school’s rules 
of conduct.47 
Therefore, under Fraser, a school may prohibit lewd, vulgar, or 
profane language on school property or at school-sanctioned 
events.48  Under Hazelwood, a school may regulate school-sponsored 
speech on the basis of any legitimate pedagogical concern.49  
Under Morse, a school may regulate speech that poses a direct 
threat to the safety of students.50  “Speech falling outside of these 
categories is subject to Tinker’s general rule: it may be regulated 
only if it would substantially disrupt school operations or interfere 




 43. Id. at 397. 
 44. Id. at 403. 
 45. Id. at 405–06. 
 46. Id. at 408; see Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 769 (5th 
Cir. 2007).  The Ponce court held that, based on Morse, school administrators do 
not need to “evaluate the potential for disruption caused by speech advocating 
drug use; it is per se unprotected because of the scope of the harm it potentially 
foments.”  Id.  The court held that disciplinary action against a student who kept 
an extended notebook diary, in which he detailed his Nazi-like group plan to 
shoot up the high school, did not violate his First Amendment rights.  Id. at 766.  
This is because this speech “pose[d] a direct threat to the physical safety of the 
school population.”  Id.  
 47. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401–02. 
 48. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
 49. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 50. Morse, 551 U.S. at 410. 
 51. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Tinker mandates that there be a “specific and significant fear of disruption, not just 
some remote apprehension of disturbance.”  Id. at 211. 
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III. TATRO V. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 
The circumstances surrounding Tatro could have been lifted 
from HBO’s dark drama, Six Feet Under.52  Tatro was enrolled in the 
University of Minnesota’s undergraduate mortuary-science 
program.53  The program prepares students to be funeral directors 
or morticians, and its required laboratory classes include anatomy, 
embalming, and restorative art.54  The lab courses use cadavers 
donated through the university’s anatomy-bequest program.55  
Tatro attended an orientation program that discussed appropriate 
conduct toward the cadavers and signed a disclosure form 
indicating that she understood and would follow the program 
rules.56 
She posted status updates on her Facebook page in November 
and December 2009, making comments such as, “Give me room, 
lots of aggression to be taken out with a trocar.”57  She referred to 
the cadaver she was practicing on at the university lab as “Bernie.”58  
Another post read: “Who knew embalming lab was so cathartic!  I 
still want to stab a certain someone in the throat with a trocar 
though.  Hmm. . .[sic] perhaps I will spend the evening updating 
my ‘Death List # 5’ and making friends with the crematory guy.  I 
do know the codeFalse[sic].”59  Tatro’s settings allowed her posts to 
be viewed by “friends” and “friends of friends,” a group that 
 
 52. Six Feet Under was a television drama that was broadcast on the cable 
network HBO from 2001–2005.  The award-winning series detailed the lives of the 
Fisher family, an eccentric clan, who operated a funeral home.  Six Feet Under: 
About the Show, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/six-feet-under/index.html#/six-feet-
under/about/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).  It won nine Emmy Awards, 
three Screen Actors Guild Awards, three Golden Globe Awards, and a Peabody 
Award.  Awards for “Six Feet Under,” IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0248654 
/awards (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).  
 53. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  “A trocar is an instrument used during embalming that has a long 
hollow needle with a sharp end, used to aspirate fluids and gases out of the body.”  
Id. at 814 n.3. 
 58. Id. at 814.  Weekend at Bernie’s is a 1989 film starring Andrew McCarthy, 
Jonathan Silverman, and Catherine Mary Stewart.  Weekend at Bernie’s, IMDB, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0098627 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).  The comedy’s 
plot involves two young men who pretend their murdered boss is still alive as a 
“frustrated hit man” continues to try to kill him.  Id.   
 59. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 814. 
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included hundreds of people.60  A student reported concerns about 
the postings to university officials.61  The director of the mortuary-
science program contacted university police on December 14, 
2009, and told Tatro not to return to class.62  After police 
concluded she had not committed a crime, she was allowed to 
return to class a few days later.63 
The university’s Office for Student Conduct and Academic 
Integrity submitted a formal complaint against Tatro on December 
29, 2009, alleging violations of the university’s student-conduct 
code.64  The complaint alleged that she “engaged in threatening, 
harassing, or assaultive conduct . . . [and] in conduct contrary to 
university rules related to the mortuary-science program, anatomy-
laboratory course rules, and the rules listed on the anatomy-
bequest-program disclosure form.”65 
A panel of the Campus Committee on Student Behavior 
(CCSB) held a hearing in March 2010.66  In April of that year, the 
CCSB issued a written decision, finding Tatro responsible for the 
violations and imposing several sanctions, including a failing grade 
in her anatomy-laboratory course and academic probation for the 
duration of her undergraduate career.67  Tatro appealed the 
decision to the provost’s appeal committee (PAC), which upheld 
the CCSB’s findings and sanctions.68  The appellate court 
considered four issues in taking her appeal, including whether the 
university’s sanctions violated her constitutional rights.69 
 
 60. Id.  Facebook describes its privacy settings this way:  
When you select an audience for your friend list, you are only controlling 
who can see it on your profile.  We call this a profile visibility control . . . . 
For example, if you select “Only Me” as the audience for your friend list, 
but your friend sets her friend list to “Public,” anyone will be able to see 
your connection on your friend’s profile. 
Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info-
on-fb#controlprofile (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
 61. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 814. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 814–15. 
 65. Id. at 815. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  Tatro also was required to enroll in a clinical ethics course, write a 
letter to mortuary-science department faculty addressing the issue of respect 
within the department and profession, and complete a psychiatric evaluation.  Id. 
 68. Id.  The provost issued a final decision, which referred to Tatro’s 
Facebook posts as ‘“disrespectful, unprofessional, and reasonably interpreted as 
threatening.”‘  Id. 
 69. Id.  The other issues Tatro unsuccessfully argued on appeal were that: (1) 
10
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Tatro framed the constitutional argument in two ways.  She 
argued first that the Tinker standard does not apply in a university 
setting.70  She further argued that the university could only limit 
speech under the true-threat doctrine.71  In writing for the appeals 
court panel, Judge Bjorkman flatly rejected these arguments72 and 
squarely invoked Tinker, holding that “Tatro’s Facebook posts 
materially and substantially disrupted the work and discipline of 
the university,” and therefore, the university did not violate her 
First Amendment rights by disciplining her.73 
IV. THE TINKER TEST SHOULD NOT APPLY TO PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 
A. Tinker Invoked, But Not Applied 
The Supreme Court has not yet held explicitly that Tinker or its 
progeny do not apply to college speech, but the Court also has 
never applied Tinker in a post-secondary-speech case.  The Supreme 
Court has, however, referenced the line of cases as it laid out the 
framework of student-speech protections in college cases.  This lack 
of express guidance has left the federal circuits split to some degree 
in interpreting the free-speech rights of post-secondary students.  
In Healy v. James, the Supreme Court’s first college speech case 
(decided just three years after Tinker), the Court began its 
discussion by quoting the language of Tinker: “First Amendment 
rights must always be applied ‘in light of the special characteristics 
of the [school] environment . . . .’”74  However, the Healy Court 
immediately took a step back: “Yet, the precedents of this Court 
leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need 
for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less 
force on college campuses than in the community at large.”75  
 
the university did not have the authority to conduct the disciplinary hearing 
because the student code of conduct did not apply to off-campus conduct and 
course-specific rules are not covered by the code; (2) the university lacked 
evidence to support the determination that Tatro violated university rules; and (3) 
the university did not have the authority to change Tatro’s course grades as a 
sanction.  Id. 
 70. Relator’s Brief and Addendum at 34–38, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 
N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (No. A10-1440), 2010 WL 7131428 at *34–38. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 821. 
 73. Id. at 822. 
 74. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 75. Id. 
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While the Court was willing to nod to Tinker, it was not willing to 
apply it. 
The Court itself explicitly acknowledged this tension.  In a 
Hazelwood footnote, for instance, the Court refused to determine 
whether the regulations it applied to high school students should 
carry over to college students.76  Justice Souter, in his 2000 Board of 
Regents v. Southworth concurrence, wrote: “[Our] cases dealing with 
the right of teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of 
students have been confined to high schools . . . whose students 
and their schools’ relation to them are different and at least 
arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college 
education.”77 
B. Differing Pedagogies 
A more deferential view of college-student speech is 
appropriate, given the vast difference between the student bodies 
and the educational missions of secondary and post-secondary 
institutions.  Students enrolled at public universities should have a 
greater degree of free-speech protections than high school and 
junior high students.  There is a glaring disparity in imposing the 
same restrictions on twenty-two-year-olds as on twelve-year-olds.  
The students have widely different levels of emotional maturity and 
brain development.78  
Perhaps more importantly, the pedagogies for these different 
ages are vastly different.  Lower-level schools aim to teach collective 
values and mores, molding young people into productive members 
of society.  Indeed, discipline is an educational component of 
primary and secondary schools.  The Fraser Court emphasized this 
necessity: 
       The process of educating our youth for citizenship in 
public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, 
and the civics class; schools must teach by example the 
 
 76. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988) (“We 
need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with 
respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university 
level.”). 
 77. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 n.4 (2000) (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
 78. See Richard Knox, The Teen Brain: It’s Just Not Grown Up Yet, NPR (Mar. 1, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124119468 
(explaining that recent studies have shown that human brains develop based on 
levels of myelin, a “fatty coating” that allows “nerve signals to flow freely”). 
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shared values of a civilized social order. . . . [T]eachers—
and indeed the older students—[must] demonstrate the 
appropriate form of civil discourse and political 
expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of 
class.79 
Elementary and high school education, thereby, is a mandatory 
system that seeks to inculcate students with collective principles of 
society and to protect impressionable minds from sensitive 
material. 
Colleges and universities, on the other hand, serve as entirely 
voluntary endeavors for their students, most of whom are legal 
adults.  Universities aim to better society and encourage intellectual 
growth.  The goal is to promote freedom of thought, to expose 
students to myriad viewpoints, and to encourage deep inquiry into 
the world.  Justice Brennan famously wrote that “the classroom is 
peculiarly the marketplace of ideas,” and the significance of 
safeguarding academic freedom in American society cannot be 
overestimated.80  As one scholar suggests, the Court’s own 
descriptions of universities, which have emphasized an “unbridled 
dialogue as an essential component of the academic endeavor, 
stand [. . .] in sharp contrast to the functions the Court has 
assigned to primary and secondary schools, which are to keep 
students safe and cultivate their moral and civic character.”81 
Equating primary school speech with college speech wrongly 
negates these distinctions.  University students have discrete rights 
that younger students do not.  There is not the strict control over 
students via an in loco parentis relationship.82  College professors and 
 
 79. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
 80. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Justice Brennan wrote that academic freedom “is of transcendent 
value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.  That freedom is 
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws 
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”  Id.  He further quoted from 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, in which the Court held, “Scholarship cannot flourish in 
an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.  Teachers and students must always 
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”  354 U.S. 234, 250 
(1957). 
 81. Kelly Sarabyn, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Resolving the Federal Circuit Split 
Over College Students’ First Amendment Rights, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 27, 28 (2008). 
 82. In loco parentis, Latin for “in the place of a parent,” is defined as, “[o]f, 
relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all 
or some of the responsibilities of a parent.  The Supreme Court has recognized 
that during the school day, an elementary or high school teacher or administrator 
13
Lindsay: Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-speech Standards Sho
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
  
2012] TINKER GOES TO COLLEGE 1483 
administrators do not stand in for students’ parents.83  Therefore, 
the in loco parentis relationship that elementary, middle, and high 
schools have with students, and that can justify restricting speech 
that undercuts the values that those schools are trying to 
indoctrinate, cannot justify such restrictions at the college level.  
College students are adults and should enjoy the same broad swath 
of First Amendment protections at school as they would in any 
other setting. 
C. U.S. Supreme Court Precedents Protect College Speech 
In fact, the Supreme Court has never upheld a student-speech 
restriction at the university level.  The significance of this 
jurisprudence is underscored by the Court’s approach to speech 
concerns at the primary school level.  Indeed, the post-secondary 
cases’ outcomes stand in opposition to the Court’s history on 
restraining secondary-student speech.  After Tinker, it sustained the 
speech restriction in every subsequent case.84  But the Court has 
ruled for students in five cases addressing university students’ 
speech.85  Four involved the funding of student groups on campus, 
and one involved a student who distributed a newspaper on 
campus.86 
While the facts in those cases are admittedly dissimilar from 
Tatro, what is crucial is the level of deference the Court repeatedly 
has afforded to the protection of college-level speech.  It has not 
linked high school- and college-speech rights.  The Court made 
 
may act in loco parentis.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (9th ed. 2009) (citing 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)). 
 83. See David L. Hudson Jr., Cyberspeech, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Apr. 9, 
2002, updated Aug. 2008), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/cyberspeech.  
The author explains that some commentators and courts “argue that school 
officials do not have jurisdiction over student Internet expression that takes place 
off campus.  The matter would be one for parental, not school, discipline, they 
argue.”  Id.  Hudson notes that former First Amendment Center Executive 
Director Ken Paulson has written: ‘“There is no legal justification for censoring a 
student’s expression in the privacy of his home.’”  Id.  
 84. See Sarabyn, supra note 81, at 41.  The author argues that this contrast 
“speaks strongly in support of a sharp distinction between student speech at a 
secondary school and student speech at a university.”  Id. 
 85. The cases are: Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of 
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Papish v. 
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); and Healy v. James, 
408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 86. See cases cited supra note 85. 
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clear in Healy that “state colleges and universities are not enclaves 
immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.”87  Rather, the 
Court noted, when the need for university students to work in an 
atmosphere free of disruption competes with the interest for 
students to have freedom of expression, “the First Amendment, 
made binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, strikes 
the required balance.”88 
One year after Healy, in Papish v. Board of Curators of the 
University of Missouri, the Court again affirmed this principle, 
holding that “Healy makes it clear that the mere dissemination of 
ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university 
campus may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of 
decency.’”89  The Papish Court determined that a political cartoon, 
depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and a newspaper 
article entitled “M—f— Acquitted,” were not constitutionally 
obscene or unprotected speech.90 
D. Circuits Fractured; Third Circuit Decisions Get it Right 
In the absence of explicit guidance from the Supreme Court, 
the federal circuits have developed contradictory standards 
concerning the First Amendment rights of college students during 
the past thirty-some years.  But two recent decisions, both in the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have analyzed the issue from the 
proper perspective and strengthened the broad rights afforded to 
college students.  In the 2008 case of DeJohn v. Temple University,91 
and again two years later in McCauley v. University of Virgin Islands,92 
the Third Circuit affirmed that greater speech protections are 
afforded to students at public universities than in primary schools.93 
To varying degrees, other circuits also have been reluctant to 
apply a secondary standard to post-secondary speech.  The First, 
Second, and Sixth Circuits have granted greater speech protections 
to university students.94  The First Circuit unequivocally asserted 
 
 87. 408 U.S. at 180 (holding that the non-recognition of a student group at 
Central Connecticut State College stifled the exercise of the group’s First 
Amendment rights).  
 88. Id. at 171. 
 89. 410 U.S. at 668. 
 90. Id. at 670. 
 91. 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 92. 618 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 93. Id. at 242; DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315. 
 94. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 352 (6th Cir. 2001).  The court held 
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that Hazelwood “is not applicable to college newspapers.”95  The 
remaining circuits, on the other hand, have unfortunately applied 
a more deferential standard for post-secondary speech.  The 
Eleventh Circuit, for instance, analyzed a college-speech case 
directly under the rubric of the Tinker line of cases, implicitly 
adopting the rule that college and high school students have the 
same First Amendment rights.96  The Tenth Circuit followed suit 
and directly applied a high school standard.97  The Fifth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits have applied secondary standards to universities 
in a more “piecemeal”98 fashion, however.99 
 
that administrators could not withhold publication of a Kentucky State University 
yearbook for being inappropriate and of poor quality.  Id. at 356–57.  The court 
did not reject secondary standards outright, however.  See id. at 346 n.5; see also 
Husain v. Springer, 494 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a public college 
president’s decision to cancel a student government election because of content 
published in the school newspaper violates the First Amendment rights of the 
student journalists). 
 95. Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989).  
There is one Eighth Circuit college-speech decision—albeit twenty-nine years 
old—that affirmed full First Amendment protection to University of Minnesota 
students.  In Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983), the appeals court 
held that a university cannot withhold funding for a student newspaper because it 
does not like the content.  “A public university may not constitutionally take 
adverse action against a student newspaper, such as withdrawing or reducing the 
paper’s funding, because it disapproves of the content of the paper.”  Id. at 282.  
Nowhere in Stanley did the court invoke Tinker.  
 96. Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344, 
1347 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that regulations which banned and limited the 
distribution of campus literature before an election were reasonably related to the 
university’s legitimate interest in “minimiz[ing] the disruptive effect of campus 
electioneering”). 
 97. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).  A Mormon 
acting student at the University of Utah sued the school after determining that her 
refusal to use swear words during classroom acting exercises would force her to 
leave the program.  Id. at 1283.  The court found that the classroom was a 
nonpublic forum and that the student’s speech constituted “school-sponsored 
speech” and was governed by Hazelwood.  Id. at 1285. 
 98. See Sarabyn, supra note 81, at 47.  The author analyzes the three circuit 
approaches and concludes that while they fall short of the “direct-application 
approach” employed by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, they have applied the 
standards in a “confused, piecemeal fashion.”  Id. 
 99. The Seventh Circuit, in Hosty v. Carter, employed a narrow view of the 
protections afforded to student publications at public universities.  412 F.3d 731 
(7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).  Hosty held that the same standard that governs 
censorship of student speech in primary and secondary schools also applies to 
speech in colleges and universities.  Id. at 735.  In response, the Illinois legislature 
passed the Campus Press Act, which took effect in 2008 and designated student 
publications as public forums that are free from censorship.  110 ILL COMP. STAT. 
13/1–13/97 (2011); Moore v. Watson, 738 F. Supp. 2d 817, 831 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
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But in justifying its application of Tinker to student speech on 
college campuses,100 the Tatro court only quoted the Third Circuit, 
a circuit that recognizes a need for “caution” in applying Tinker.101  
Tatro misinterpreted DeJohn and wrongly asserted that the Third 
Circuit analyzed a university’s speech policy for overbreadth under 
the framework of Tinker.102  To the contrary, DeJohn took pains to 
show that simply applying a secondary-speech framework to a 
university setting is insufficient, because university “administrators 
are granted less leeway in regulating student speech.”103 
In DeJohn, the Third Circuit found that the sexual harassment 
policy at Temple University was facially unconstitutional because it 
was overbroad.104  It determined that the policy could have a 
chilling effect on speech related to gender issues.105  The DeJohn 
court went on to hold that a secondary school’s ability to restrict 
certain speech does not mean that public colleges could restrict the 
same speech.106  The court further noted that: 
Discussion by adult students in a college classroom should 
not be restricted.  Certain speech, however, which cannot 
be prohibited to adults may be prohibited to public 
elementary and high school students.  This is particularly 
true when considering that public elementary and high 
school administrators have the unique responsibility to act 
in loco parentis.107 
In McCauley, the Third Circuit further delineated the 
differences between the free-speech rights afforded to secondary 
and post-secondary students.108  It again struck down speech codes, 
this time a section of the harassment policy at the University of the 
Virgin Islands.109  It reaffirmed the rule from DeJohn that public 
colleges and universities have “significantly less leeway in regulating 
 
 100. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 101. DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 318 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 102. In fact, DeJohn actually employed the overbreadth analysis it used in Saxe 
v. State College Area School District, 240 F.3d 200, 214 (2001).  In doing so, the court 
pointed out that “there is a difference between the extent that a school may 
regulate student speech in a public university setting as opposed to that of a public 
elementary or high school.”  DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315. 
 103. Id. at 316 (citing Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 
243, 260 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 104. Id. at 304, 320. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 315.  
 107. Id. (citation omitted). 
 108. McCauley v. Univ. of the Virgin Is., 618 F.3d 232, 242–47 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 109. Id. at 250.  
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student speech than public elementary or high schools.”110  
McCauley then articulated five factors for reaching this conclusion: 
(1) the different “pedagogical goals of each institution,” (2) “the in 
loco parentis role of public elementary and high school 
administrators,” (3) the discipline needs of public elementary and 
high schools, (4) student maturity, and (5) the fact that many 
university students live on campus and are continually subject to 
university rules.111 
E. Tatro Fails to Recognize Crucial Distinctions Between Speech 
Protections at Primary and University Levels  
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, did not appear to 
see the distinctions between university and primary and secondary 
students as critical.  The court was unconcerned about whether the 
Tinker substantial-disruption test should apply in a university 
setting.112  The court noted that it could “discern no practical 
reasons for such a distinction” and simply observed that other 
lower courts have applied the Tinker standard to public 
universities.113  The court ceded that what comprises a substantial 
disruption “in a primary school may look very different in a 
university.  But these differences do not per se remove the Tinker 
line of cases from the analysis.”114  
Without further consideration, the court applied Tinker.115  But 
its own explicit acknowledgment of the differences between the 
institutions should have entered, if not altered, its analysis.  
Nevertheless, it did not.  The court failed to consider how a 
substantial disruption might look different on a college campus 
than in a high school classroom.  It failed to touch on why caution 
would be prudent in applying Tinker and how the pedagogical goals 
 
 110. Id. at 247 (citing DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316).  The court continued: 
At a minimum, the teachings of Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, Morse, and other 
decisions involving speech in public elementary and high schools, cannot 
be taken as gospel in cases involving public universities.  Any application 
of free speech doctrine derived from these decisions to the university 
setting should be scrutinized carefully, with an emphasis on the 
underlying reasoning of the rule to be applied.   
Id. 
 111. Id. at 242–43.  
 112. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (citation omitted). 
 115. Id. 
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss4/5
  
1488 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:4 
of high schools and colleges are extraordinarily different. 
Instead, in a reflexive manner, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
applied the Tinker standard, a standard that is rarely used on 
college students in such an exacting manner.  Although it upheld 
DeJohn, the court regrettably did not follow the spirit of the Third 
Circuit’s jurisprudence.  It ignored McCauley outright.  It did not 
afford university leaders less leeway when they disciplined Tatro for 
her speech.  Rather, it allowed them to sanction her off-campus 
speech under a standard other courts likely would have been 
reluctant to apply to junior high students blogging in class. 
V. ONLINE SPEECH LIKE TATRO’S IS PROTECTED SPEECH 
A. U.S. Supreme Court Has Not Ruled on Student Internet Speech Rights 
Even if the Tinker standard were found to carry over to 
university speech, it should not apply to off-campus speech like 
Tatro’s.  Nowhere in its student-speech cases has the Supreme 
Court expressly authorized the restriction of off-campus speech.  
Whether speech is on campus or off, therefore, becomes a 
threshold question in determining whether it is protected.116  
Moreover, signals from the Court support the proposition that 
students can be sanctioned only for speech that occurs on campus.  
The Court in Morse emphasized that, if the sanctioned speech in 
question had occurred off campus, it would have been protected.117  
Although Morse did involve the sanctioning of speech that was 
technically off campus, it notably occurred during a school event.118  
In writing for the majority in Morse, Chief Justice Roberts stated 
that the speech restriction applied off campus because the student 
was at a school-sponsored event.119  He referred to the Court’s 
decision in Bethel, noting that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same 
speech in a public forum outside the school context, [he] would 
have been protected.”120  Likewise, Justice Brennan’s Bethel 
concurrence stated that “[i]f respondent had given the same 
 
 116. When courts have allowed the restriction of students’ off-campus speech, 
it typically is in the context of speech that is directed at the school and brought on 
campus.  See LaVine ex rel. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 991–92 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (upholding expulsion of a student who brought a poem he wrote at 
home about shooting fellow students to school and showed his English teacher). 
 117. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007). 
 118. Id. at 400–01. 
 119. Id. at 401. 
 120. Id. at 405 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). 
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speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been 
penalized simply because government officials considered his 
language to be inappropriate.”121  
The very premise of Tinker—that students do not shed their 
First Amendment right to free speech at the “schoolhouse 
gate”122—indicates that the restrictions at stake occur at school.  
Outside of school, students’ First Amendment rights should be 
firmly in place.123  The modern inquiry has become whether school 
officials can extend their authority from the schoolhouse gate to 
students’ online activity, much of which is done at home, on their 
own phones and computers. 
The Court has never decided an Internet speech case, so it has 
not delineated whether online activity amounts to on- or off-
campus activity.  However, the absence of Supreme Court 
precedent over the extension of First Amendment protections to 
student cyberspeech has not slowed the volume of cases addressing 
the issue.  Particularly in 2011, there was a flurry of circuit decisions 
around the off-campus nature of student cyberspeech.124 
B. Recent Case Law Concludes Online, Off-Campus Speech is Protected 
The Tatro court wrongly applied the Tinker analysis to Tatro’s 
online, off-campus posts.  The court held that the university did not 
violate Tatro’s free-speech rights because her online posts fell 
within the confines of the university’s Student Conduct Code.125  
 
 121. 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Cohen, 403 
U.S. at 15). 
 122. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).  
 123. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044–45 (2d Cir. 1979).  The 
Thomas court stated: 
[O]ur willingness to defer to the schoolmaster’s expertise in 
administering school discipline rests, in large measure, upon the 
supposition that the arm of authority does not reach beyond the 
schoolhouse gate. When an educator seeks to extend his dominion 
beyond these bounds, therefore, he must answer to the same 
constitutional commands that bind all other institutions of government. 
Id. 
 124. The circuit rulings regarding online student speech released in 2011 
include Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); 
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School District, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 
2011); and Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 125. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).  The 
Code of Conduct covers off-campus activity that “adversely affects a substantial 
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Nowhere in its decision did the court acknowledge that there was 
even the hint of a question in applying Tinker to off-campus speech.  
But a growing body of federal case law supports the proposition 
that high school students’ online posts, published off-campus, are 
protected speech.126 
Two similar, but separate, Third Circuit cases, both decided en 
banc with opinions simultaneously issued one month before Tatro, 
clearly prevent school officials from disciplining students based on 
online, off-campus speech.  In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage 
School District, the appeals court unanimously held that a high 
school could not punish a student for online speech merely 
because the speech was vulgar and reached the school.127  And in 
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third Circuit, in 
an 8-6 decision, noted that the Supreme Court has never allowed 
“schools to punish students for off-campus speech that is not 
school-sponsored or at a school-sponsored event and that caused 
no substantial disruption at school.”128  To do so would 
“significantly broaden school districts’ authority over student 
speech and would vest school officials with dangerously overbroad 
censorship discretion.”129 
The Third Circuit in Blue Mountain held that a Pennsylvania 
student who mocked her principal on Myspace could not be 
disciplined because the speech did not cause a material disruption 
of school activities and “could not reasonably have led school 
officials to forecast substantial disruption.”130  The court further 
held that a student’s speech that originally was made off campus 
did not become on-campus speech when another student brought 
 
University interest and . . . indicates that the student may present a danger or 
threat to the health or safety of the student or others.”  Id. 
 126. See, e.g., Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d 915; Layshock, 650 F.3d 205; T.V. ex rel. 
B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-290-PPS, 2011 WL 3501698 
(N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2011); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010); 
Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Emmett v. 
Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).  
 127. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207. 
 128. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 933.  In 2010, two three-judge panels of the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued conflicting decisions in Layshock and Blue 
Mountain, which present similar facts and issues. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010).   Due to the inconsistencies, the 
Third Circuit vacated the rulings and re-heard the cases en banc in 2011.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 920. 
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a copy of it to school.131  The school district could not punish the 
student for use of profane language outside the school, during 
non-school hours.132  While the majority opinion expressly left open 
the question of whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech in the 
first place, five judges signed on to a concurrence that opined that 
it does not.133  Judge Smith wrote, “[T]he First Amendment 
protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent 
it protects speech by citizens in the community at large.”134 
The Third Circuit also overruled the district court’s 
contention that even if the speech was not a material and 
substantial disruption under Tinker, it was still prohibited speech 
under the Fraser exception.135  The school district had argued its 
discipline was justified because the speech “was lewd, vulgar, and 
offensive [and] had an effect on the school and the educational 
mission of the District.”136  But the Third Circuit concluded that 
Fraser did not apply to off-campus speech:  
Under these circumstances, to apply the Fraser standard to 
justify the School District’s punishment of J.S.’s speech 
would be to adopt a rule that allows school officials to 
punish any speech by a student that takes place anywhere, 
at any time, as long as it is about the school or a school 
official, is brought to the attention of a school official, and 
is deemed “offensive” by the prevailing authority.137 
Layshock, the other Third Circuit case, also involved a Myspace 
parody of a principal.  Again, the court held that a school district 
did not have authority to punish a student for expressive conduct 
outside of school that the district considered lewd and offensive.138  
The student, Pennsylvania high school senior Justin Layshock, 
 
 131. Id. at 932. 
 132. Id.  The eighth-grade student (J.S.) and her friend used her home 
computer to create a Myspace profile making fun of her principal.  Id. at 920.  The 
fake profile contained profane attacks and “sexually explicit content.”  Id.  The day 
it was posted, it could be viewed by anyone who knew the URL or who was 
searching Myspace.  Id. at 921.  The students made it “private” the next day, 
limiting access to only people they had “friended” on the site.  Id.  The principal 
requested that another student bring in a printout of the profile.  Id.  After the 
principal obtained a copy of the profile, he suspended J.S. for ten days.  Id. at 922. 
 133. Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 932 (majority opinion). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 933. 
 138. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
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along with three other students, created an offensive bogus profile 
that mocked and degraded the school’s principal.139  When 
Layshock allowed other students to view the profile, word of it 
“spread like wildfire” among the students at Hickory High.140  
Layshock was suspended for ten days, placed in an alternative high 
school, banned from all extracurricular activities, and prevented 
from attending his graduation ceremony.141 
The court determined that although Layshock had cut and 
pasted a picture of the principal from the school’s web site, that 
action alone did not create a sufficient nexus between the school 
and the online profile.142  The relationship between his conduct 
and the school was too attenuated, and Layshock could not be 
punished simply because the speech reached inside the school.143  
The Fifth Circuit also has protected student speech made off 
campus.  In Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, the court upheld 
summary judgment for a school principal based on the defense of 
qualified immunity,144 but determined that a student’s violent 
sketch, drawn two years earlier and accidentally brought to school 
by his little brother, was protected speech.145 
An Indiana district court judge expressly followed Layshock and 
Blue Mountain in August 2011, holding that school administrators 
exceeded their authority when they disciplined high school girls 
who posed for sexually suggestive pictures and posted them online 
during a summer sleepover party.146  The girls did not bring the 
 
 139. Id. at 207–08. 
 140. Id. at 208. 
 141. Id. at 210. 
 142. Id. at 215–16. 
 143. Id. at 216.  The court made clear what was at stake: 
It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in 
the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control 
his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that child 
when he/she participates in school sponsored activities.  Allowing the 
District to punish Justin for conduct he engaged in while at his 
grandmother’s house using his grandmother’s computer would create 
just such a precedent, and we therefore conclude that the district court 
correctly ruled that the District’s response to Justin’s expressive conduct 
violated the First Amendment guarantee of free expression. 
Id. 
 144. The defense of qualified immunity shields school officials from liability 
for civil damages when their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  See 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 145. 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).  
 146. T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-290-PPS, 
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images to school, and all the activity took place off campus.  The 
court in T.V. ex rel. v. Smith-Green Community School Corp. stated that 
the district’s contention—that the photographs were not entitled to 
First Amendment protection because they were lewd and vulgar 
under Fraser—”fails at the outset[,]” because the case does not 
apply to off-campus speech.147 
Federal case law protecting online speech has been wide-
ranging in recent years.  In the 2010 case of Evans v. Bayer, a federal 
magistrate judge ruled that a Florida high school student’s 
Facebook posts were off-campus, protected speech.148  In Emmett v. 
Kent School District No. 415, the court granted a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the five-day suspension of a high school 
student who created a mock “obituaries” site from his home 
computer.149  In addition to the satirical obituaries written about 
two of his friends, the site allowed visitors to vote on who would 
“die” next and become the subject of the subsequent obituary.150  
The court found that school officials presented no evidence that 
the web site “intended to threaten anyone, did actually threaten 
anyone, or manifested any violent tendencies whatsoever.”151 
In Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks School District, a district court 
determined that the disciplinary action taken against a high school 
student for posting Internet messages on an online message board 
was unconstitutional.152  The student posted three messages from 
 
2011 WL 3501698 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2011).  The teenage plaintiffs, T.V. and 
M.K., posted suggestive pictures of themselves with phallic-shaped lollipops and 
added vulgar captions to the photos.  The photographs were taken and posted at 
home onto Myspace and Facebook accounts, where they were generally available 
to students who had been granted “Friend” status.  Id. at *2.  Another student’s 
mother brought printouts of the pictures to the district superintendent, reporting 
that the photos were causing “divisiveness” among students on the girls’ volleyball 
teams.  Id.  The girls ultimately were suspended from extracurricular activities for a 
portion of the year.  Id. at *3. 
 147. Id. at *9.  In granting summary judgment to the teenage plaintiffs, Chief 
Judge Simon wisely noted that “[n]ot much good takes place at slumber parties for 
high school kids, and this case proves the point.”  Id. at *1. 
 148. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010).  The court in Evans denied the 
district’s motion to dismiss, determining that officials who disciplined student 
Katherine Evans after she created a Facebook group aimed at criticizing a teacher, 
violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Id.  The page was created 
off-campus, did not occur at a school-sponsored activity, and was not accessed at 
school.  Id. at 1372.  Therefore, the connection to campus was too attenuated.  Id.  
 149. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090–91 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 150. Id. at 1089. 
 151. Id. at 1090.   
 152. 247 F. Supp. 2d 698 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
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his parents’ home and one from school.153  The student handbook 
prohibited speech that was abusive, harassment, inappropriate, and 
offensive, but did not geographically limit the school’s authority to 
discipline speech.154  The court found that the handbook policies 
were constitutionally overbroad because they were not linked to 
speech that substantially disrupted school operations.155  The court 
also determined that the policies were overbroad since they could 
be read to cover speech that occurred off the school’s campus and 
that was not school related.156 
The issue of whether school officials have legal authority to 
regulate student cyberspeech is far from settled.  However, the 
most recent case law suggests that much of students’ online speech 
is clearly protected, particularly when it was not directed at campus, 
not accessed on campus, and caused no substantial disruption of 
educational activities on campus.157 
C. Cases That Have Upheld Restrictions of Online Speech are Inapposite 
to Tatro 
The courts are divided on several important legal questions 
about online speech that is created off campus, including whether 
school officials have more authority to regulate online speech if it 
links to the school’s web site and is aimed directly at the school’s 
audience.158  A key case that stands for the proposition that it 
matters to whom the online speech is aimed is J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. 
Bethlehem Area School District, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court was confronted with a web site created by a student on his 
home computer.159  The site was titled “Teacher Sux” and 
“consisted of a number of web pages that made derogatory, 
profane, offensive and threatening comments, primarily about the 
student’s algebra teacher . . . .”160  The court found that the speech 
was on-campus because the student “facilitated the on-campus 
nature of the speech by accessing the web site on a school 
computer in a classroom, showing the site to another student, and 
 
 153. Id. at 700.   
 154. Id. at 702.   
 155. Id. at 705. 
 156. Id. at 705–06. 
 157. See discussion infra Part V.C. 
 158. See Hudson, supra note 83.  
 159. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
 160. Id. at 851. 
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by informing other students at school of the existence of the web 
site.”161 
Following in the vein of Bethlehem, a body of case law suggests 
that school officials can discipline students for online, off-campus 
speech.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals drew a parallel between 
Tatro and one of these cases,162 but the case the court relied on is 
not analogous and neither is the line of cases that have restricted 
online speech.  They are distinguishable from Tatro in two keys 
ways.  One line of cases has upheld the regulation of online speech 
when the speech was targeted at the school and did in fact cause an 
actual substantial disruption on campus.  In the other line of cases, 
the regulated speech threatened violence and could also have been 
restricted under the “true-threat” doctrine.  Moreover, given that 
the violence threatened in those cases would have occurred on 
campus if carried out, there was a reasonable argument that, as 
students and staff heard about the threats, the speech would meet 
Tinker’s standard. 
Therefore, even if Tinker could be applied to off-campus, 
online speech, it does not apply to speech that is not likely to cause 
a material and substantial disruption on campus.  Neither line of 
cases applies to Tatro, and the appeals court wrongly made the link.  
Tatro’s postings did not cause—and were not reasonably likely to 
cause—a material and substantial disruption to the work and 
discipline of the university.163  Her Facebook posts could not 
reasonably be construed as threatening actual violence, and any 
actual disruption on campus was the result of the university’s 




 161. Id. at 865.  The court also found it significant that the “web site was aimed 
not at a random audience, but at the specific audience of students and others 
connected with this particular School District . . . .”  Id.  The court therefore held: 
“[W]here speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought 
onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will be 
considered on-campus speech.”  Id. 
 162. The Tatro court cites Wisniewski v. Board of Education, 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 
2007).  Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 163. See discussion infra Part VI.  
 164. See discussion infra Parts VI, VII.  
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D. Online Speech Restricted Where it Targeted School and Caused Actual 
Substantial Disruption 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals used a 2007 Second Circuit 
case, Wisniewski v. Board of Education,165 to stand for the proposition 
that Tinker’s substantial-disruption standard should apply to off-
campus student speech that could be “reasonably understood as 
urging violent conduct.”166  Applying the Tinker analysis, the court 
in Wisniewski held that it was reasonably foreseeable that a student’s 
online communication would cause a substantial disruption within 
the school, and as such, the school district did not violate the 
student’s First Amendment rights by disciplining him.167  But the 
Tatro comparison to Wisniewski, which involved outside messages 
that threatened violence inside the school, falls short.  Parents of 
eighth-grader Aaron Wisniewski appealed his semester-long 
suspension for sharing with multiple friends, via online instant 
messages, an icon that depicted the shooting and killing of his 
junior high English teacher.168  The drawings he e-mailed to 
classmates displayed a gun shooting someone in the head, dots 
representing splattered blood, and the words “kill” along with the 
name of Wisniewski’s teacher.169  The court determined it was 
“reasonably foreseeable” that the picture would reach the teacher 
and administrators and that it would “create a risk of substantial 
disruption.”170 
 
 165. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).  The Third Circuit in Blue Mountain expressly 
disputed the dissenting opinion that the majority decision was creating a split with 
the Second Circuit in Wisnewiski.  J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 
650 F.3d 915, 931 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011).  The Third Circuit noted that each case was 
decided on the facts and rejected an assertion that the Second Circuit had 
determined “that off-campus hostile and offensive student internet speech that is 
directed at school officials results in a substantial disruption of the classroom 
environment.”  Id.  The court wrote: 
“[O]ff-campus hostile and offensive student internet speech” will not 
necessarily create a material and substantial disruption at school nor will 
it reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption in 
school.  Further, the facts of the cases cited by the dissent in support of 
its proposition that we have created a circuit split differ considerably 
from the facts presented in this case. 
Id. 
 166. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 821. 
 167. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40. 
 168. Id. at 35–36. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.  The court further stated that “[t]he fact that Aaron’s creation and 
transmission of the IM icon occurred away from school property does not 
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Although the investigating police officer concluded that the 
drawing was meant in jest, the teacher quit teaching that class for 
the remainder of the year.  His position had to be replaced, and 
students were taken from class and interviewed about the 
messages.171  This caused an actual disruption to classroom activities 
in a way that Tatro’s posts did not.172  
The Eighth Circuit was one of four circuits to issue a ruling on 
restricting student cyberspeech in 2011.  In August, with D.J.M. ex 
rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60, it held that a 
Missouri high school student’s instant messages from his home 
computer to a friend about shooting his classmates did not 
constitute protected speech under either a “true-threat” analysis or 
Tinker’s substantial-disruption test.173  “D.J.M.” was in the fall of his 
sophomore year when he sent messages indicating that, if he could 
get a gun, a certain named classmate “would be the first to die.”174  
The student he had been chatting with online brought the 
messages to school administrators, who alerted the police.175  D.J.M. 
was placed in juvenile detention, a psychiatric hospital, and 
ultimately was suspended for the remainder of the school year.176  
His parents sued the school, alleging that the suspension violated 
his First Amendment rights. 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the messages amounted to 
a true threat.177  True threats are not protected under the First 
Amendment, and school administrators “reasonably feared D.J.M. 
had access to a handgun and was thinking about shooting specific 
classmates at the high school.”178  The Eighth Circuit did not stop at 
its true-threat analysis, however, but went further and invoked 
Tinker, holding that “it was reasonably foreseeable that D.J.M.’s 
threats about shooting specific students in school would be brought 
 
necessarily insulate him from school discipline.”  Id. at 39. 
 171. Id. at 36. 
 172. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 173. 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 174. Id. at 758. 
 175. Id. at 759. 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. at 764.  The court quoted its definition of a true threat from Doe v. 
Pulaski County Special School District: “a ‘statement that a reasonable recipient would 
have interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm or cause injury to 
another.’”  Id. at 762 (quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 
624 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).  The speaker must have intended to communicate 
his statement to another, which includes a third party.  Id.  
 178. Id. at 764. 
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to the attention of school authorities and create a risk of substantial 
disruption within the school environment.”179  The court did note 
that “[s]chool officials cannot constitutionally reach out to 
discover, monitor, or punish any type of student speech.”180  But 
when there was a threat of a student shooting specific classmates on 
campus, the off-campus messages became punishable when 
brought on school grounds.181 
In another 2011 decision, the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski v. 
Berkeley County Schools upheld the suspension of a high school 
student who created a discussion group web page on Myspace, with 
the heading “S.A.S.H.,” (apparently an acronym for “Students 
Against Shay’s Herpes”) referring to a classmate who was the topic 
of the page’s ridicule.182  Senior Kara Kowalski, who created the 
page and invited one hundred of her Myspace friends to join the 
group on her home computer, argued that her conduct was 
shielded by the First Amendment because the speech not only 
occurred off campus, but was not school-related.183 
The school district contended that they could regulate off-
campus behavior as long as the behavior created a foreseeable risk 
of reaching the school and causing a substantial disruption to the 
work and discipline of the school.184  The court agreed that 
Kowalski’s conduct met this standard, finding that the “targeted, 
defamatory nature of Kowalski’s speech, aimed at a fellow 
classmate,” created actual substantial disorder and disruption at 
school.185 
The court found that it was foreseeable that the expression 
would reach the school because students accessed the web site on 
campus, and Kowalski’s conduct involved substantial disruption of 
and interference with the work and the discipline of the school.186  
She used the Internet to “orchestrate a targeted attack on a 
classmate, and did so in a manner that was sufficiently connected to 
the school environment as to implicate the School District’s 
recognized authority to discipline speech . . . .”187  But the court 
 
 179. Id. at 766. 
 180. Id. at 765. 
 181. Id. 
 182. 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 571. 
 185. Id. at 574. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 567. 
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also noted that there is a limit to the “scope of a high school’s 
interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students when the 
speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse gate.”188 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals released an opinion in 
2011 that sent a mixed message for student speech.  In Doninger v. 
Niehoff, the appeals court upheld summary judgment for a school 
district, on the grounds of qualified immunity, against a claim that 
the district violated a blogging high school student’s First 
Amendment rights.189  The court ruled that school administrators 
did not violate “clearly established” First Amendment precedent, 
either when they disciplined senior Avery Doninger for her off-
campus blog or when they prevented her from wearing a “Team 
Avery” T-shirt at a school assembly to protest the initial discipline.190  
The narrow ruling turned solely on qualified immunity, however, 
and the court explicitly declined to address whether Doninger’s 
free-speech rights had been violated.191 
Doninger was prohibited from running for class secretary after 
she posted a vulgar and misleading message on an independently 
operated, public blog about the supposed cancellation of a school 
event, an annual battle-of-the-bands concert.192  She called school 
administrators “douche bags” on the blog and, in an e-mail, 
encouraged others to contact the superintendent “to piss her off 
 
 188. Id. at 573.  The court continued: 
       But we need not fully define that limit here, as we are satisfied that 
the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to Musselman High School’s pedagogical 
interests was sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by school 
officials in carrying out their role as the trustees of the student body’s 
well-being. 
       Of course, had Kowalski created the “S.A.S.H.” group during school 
hours, using a school-provided computer and Internet connection, this 
case would be more clear-cut, as the question of where speech that was 
transmitted by the Internet “occurred” would not come into play.  To be 
sure, a court could determine that speech originating outside of the 
schoolhouse gate but directed at persons in school and received by and 
acted on by them was in fact in-school speech. . . . We need not resolve, 
however, whether this was in-school speech and therefore whether Fraser 
could apply because the School District was authorized by Tinker to 
discipline Kowalski, regardless of where her speech originated . . . . 
Id. 
 189. 642 F.3d 334, 338 (2d Cir. 2011).  This case is referred to as Doninger III.  
The Second Circuit upheld a 2007 district court decision that denied the plaintiff 
student’s motion for a preliminary injunction.  Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 190. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 346, 351. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45. 
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more.”193  After she was banned from running for class office, and 
others started a write-in campaign for her, she contemplated but 
was prohibited from wearing a “Team Avery” t-shirt during a school 
assembly.194 
Doninger argued that her First Amendment rights were so 
clearly established that no reasonable jury could conclude 
otherwise.195  The court did not determine that the post had 
necessarily caused the requisite substantial disruption to school 
activities, and it did not rule on whether her First Amendment 
rights had been violated.196  It noted that “the controversy over [the 
battle-of-the-bands concert’s] scheduling had already resulted in a 
deluge of phone calls and emails, several disrupted schedules, and 
many upset students even before Doninger posted her 
comments . . . .”197  But the court determined that First 
Amendment law is so muddled and difficult that even “lawyers, law 
professors, and judges” are unclear what standards apply.198  If 
those in the legal profession have difficulty reconciling student-
speech protections, the court reasoned, then school administrators 
should not be held personally liable under such circumstances 
when a reasonable jury could find that they got it wrong. 
The fact that the Second Circuit refused to decide whether 
Doninger’s First Amendment rights were violated appears to be an 
indication that the court was not willing to extend jurisdiction over 
online speech that far.  The Doninger case exemplifies off-campus, 
online conduct that was far more direct and targeted than Tatro’s.  
The facts suggest more strongly that an actual material disruption 
happened on campus, and Doninger’s conduct clearly was aimed at 
the school.  But the court still declined to find that her speech was 
unprotected. 
Tatro did not intend for her speech to reach the school.  Her 
Facebook settings were configured so that only her friends and 
their friends could view her posts (a number admittedly in the 
hundreds).199  Many of the lower courts have held that schools 
 
 193. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 340–41. 
 194. Id. at 343. 
 195. Id. at 346. 
 196. Id. at 348–49. 
 197. Id. at 349. 
 198. Id. at 353.  The court continued, “The relevant Supreme Court cases can 
be hard to reconcile, and courts often struggle to determine which standard 
applies in any particular case.”  Id. 
 199. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
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cannot discipline students for online speech unless it has a “nexus 
with the school.”200  Courts have used varied approaches in 
determining what comprises this nexus.201  In Blue Mountain, for 
instance, the court found it significant that the student (like Tatro) 
did not intend for her off-campus speech to reach the school—”in 
fact, she took specific steps to make the profile ‘private’ so that only 
her friends could access it.”202 
If there is a rule then that can be discerned from the multiple 
and seemingly disparate circuit decisions, it is that for online 
speech to be considered within a school’s jurisdiction, it must be 
(1) directed at the school, (2) threatening, and (3) likely to cause a 
substantial disruption to educational activities on campus.  Layshock 
and Blue Mountain clearly stand for the principle that students 
cannot be punished for online speech, created outside of school, 
that fails to cause a substantial and material disruption on 
campus.203  In the rulings that upheld restrictions of online speech, 
as in Weisnewski, the threatening behavior directed at the school 
caused a material and substantial disruption to classroom activities.  
Tatro’s speech was far more satirical than it was threatening, and 
the expression itself was not what caused a material and substantial 
disruption on campus, if there was one at all. 
VI. TATRO’S SPEECH DID NOT CAUSE A MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL 
DISRUPTION  
A. University Overreaction Caused Disruption, If There Was One, Not 
Tatro’s Speech 
Assuming, arguendo, that the K-12 Tinker standard should 
apply to university students and that it also should carry over to off-
campus, online speech, Tatro’s posts still should be protected 
under the First Amendment.  Even if the Tinker standard were the 
proper one, the standard has not been met in this case.  Under 
Tinker, a school may regulate student speech that creates a material 
and substantial disruption to the school’s work or discipline, or 
where school officials could reasonably “forecast substantial 
 
 200. See 1 RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE 
PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 2:26 (2011). 
 201. Id. 
 202. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 203. See supra notes 127–143 and discussion. 
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss4/5
  
1502 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:4 
disruption of or material interference with school activities.”204  
There simply is no evidence to suggest that Tatro’s posts caused 
such a disruption to the university—or that school officials could 
have reasonably predicted that it would. 
Furthermore, if there was such a disruption to school activities, 
it occurred as a result of the overreaction of university 
administrators to the Facebook posts.  School officials cannot 
bootstrap the limited exceptions to the protection of the First 
Amendment into restricting speech they find unpleasant or 
uncomfortable.  This type of bootstrapping, however, is exactly 
what happened in Tatro.  After a single student complained about 
the Facebook post, the department head contacted the university 
police, who investigated and determined that there was no real 
threat of violence.205  The posts themselves appear obviously 
satirical, even if in poor humor and lacking sensitivity to the 
families of the cadaver donors.  No facts amount to a material and 
substantial disruption.  Rather, the disruption the administration 
and the court seemed most concerned about is that Tatro’s posts 
“presented substantial concerns about the integrity of the anatomy-
bequest program.”206  This is because donors and funeral directors 
eventually contacted the university about Tatro’s conduct and the 
professionalism of the program.207  If this disruption does indeed 
qualify as substantial under Tinker, it was the result of the 
university’s reaction and subsequent media attention, not Tatro’s 
expression itself. 
B. Any Disruption on Campus Did Not Rise to Requisite Level 
A wide body of school-speech jurisprudence supports the 
proposition that facts like those in Tatro do not give rise to a 
substantial disruption of the work and discipline of the school.  In 
Tinker, when students “neither interrupted school activities nor 
sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others . . . 
[and] caused discussion outside of the classrooms, but no 
 
 204. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 205. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 206. Id. at 822. 
 207. Minnesota media reported on the University of Minnesota’s discipline of 
Tatro.  See, e.g., Jenna Ross, Student Banned from U After Facebook Posts, STARTRIBUNE 
(Dec. 15, 2009, 11:23 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis 
/79361082.html.  Local media outlets have also covered Tatro’s appeals.  See, e.g., 
Jane Pribek, U of M Action Upheld in Facebook Incident, MINN. LAW., July 18, 2011, at 
2. 
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interference with work and no disorder . . . [the] Constitution does 
not permit officials of the State to deny their form of expression.”208  
Courts have repeatedly emphasized that the “mere desire to avoid 
‘discomfort’ or ‘unpleasantness’ is not enough to justify restricting 
student speech under Tinker.”209 
In Blue Mountain, for instance, school officials claimed that the 
mock online profile disrupted school because there were general 
“rumblings” regarding it.210  More than twenty students viewed the 
Myspace parody online, students talked about it in class, and staff 
had to adjust their schedules to meet with J.S. and her parents.211  
However, the Third Circuit found that none of this amounted to a 
material disruption.212  The court further noted that it was the 
principal’s response to the parody that “exacerbated rather than 
contained the disruption in the school.”213 
Similarly, in the case of the high school students who posted 
racy photos of themselves online, the court held that any “actual 
disruption” caused by the photographs “does not come close” to 
meeting the Tinker standard.214  The court found that the acts of 
officials responding to two complaints from parents on the girls’ 
volleyball team and students sniping at one another amounted only 
to “unremarkable dissension.”215  Likewise, a California district 
court determined that a YouTube video, in which students made 
 
 208. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 209. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000)); 
see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 
(5th Cir. 1972) (holding that a school board could not discipline students for the 
distribution of an off-campus newspaper where “[a]s a factual matter there were 
no disruptions of class; there were no disturbances of any sort, on or off campus”).  
The court refused to rule on the remaining threshold question of whether the 
Tinker standard could ever apply to off-campus conduct, however. Shanley, 462 F.2d 
at 974. 
 210. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 922 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 211. Id. at 922–23. 
 212. Id. at 928.  
 213. Id. at 931.  But cf. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that punishment was justified, under the Tinker standard, where students 
circulated a petition to fellow football players calling for the ouster of their 
football coach, causing the school to have to call a team meeting to ensure “team 
unity,” and “eroding [the coach’s] authority and dividing players into opposing 
camps”). 
 214. T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-290-PPS, 
2011 WL 3501698, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2011). 
 215. Id. at *13. 
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“derogatory, sexual, and defamatory” statements about a thirteen-
year-old classmate, did not rise to the level of a substantial 
disruption of classroom activities.216  On summary judgment, the 
court found that five students missing some part of class, an angry 
parent calling, and one student who would not go to class was not 
enough.217  “The mere ‘buzz’ about the profile, standing alone, was 
not sufficient under Tinker to constitute a substantial disruption.”218 
Even in instances where the speech at issue originated off 
campus but was brought on campus, courts have reaffirmed that 
disliking the speech is not enough to justify its restriction under 
Tinker.  In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, a student was 
suspended after he created a vulgar and derogatory “top ten” list 
about the high school athletic director and e-mailed it to other 
students from his home computer.219  In granting summary 
judgment to the student, the district court held that the school 
district failed to “adduce any evidence of actual disruption.”220  
“[T]he list was on school grounds for several days before the 
administration became aware of its existence, and at least one week 
passed before the [administration] took any action.”221  The 
speech, although upsetting, was not threatening and “did not cause 
any faculty member to take a leave of absence.”222  The court noted 
that although the coach was upset and had a hard time doing his 
job and that a librarian “was almost in tears,” the events did not rise 
to the level of a substantial disruption.223 
   As these high school speech cases make clear, speech that 
causes a substantial disruption must be more than an irritant or an 
embarrassment.  Even where the speech is threatening, courts have 
 
 216. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1108, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  The fact that the conduct occurred outside of school 
did not prevent that school from disciplining the plaintiff student for such 
conduct, especially because it was reasonably foreseeable that the video made by 
the student would find its way to campus.  Id. at 1107–08.  Although the court held 
that Tinker applies to both on- and off-campus speech, the court found that there 
was no substantial disruption of school activities and no reasonably foreseeable 
risk of substantial disruption of school activities as a result of the video.  Id. at 
1117.  Discipline of the student thus violated the First Amendment regardless of 
where the speech took place.  Id. at 1122–23. 
 217. Id. at 1117–-19. 
 218. Id. at 1112. 
 219. 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
 220. Id. at 455. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 455–56. 
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determined that there must be a specific, imminent threat directed 
at an individual on campus for there to be a substantial disruption.  
In Murakowski v. University of Delaware, for instance, although the 
court improperly used Tinker’s substantial disruption test to analyze 
the speech of a university student who posted violent writings 
against women and homosexuals, it found that the student’s speech 
could not be sanctioned.224 
Maciej Murakowski, a nineteen-year-old student at the 
University of Delaware, created a website in 2005 on the university’s 
servers that included violent, sexually explicit material, including 
musings on the rape and torture of women.225  A fellow female 
student, who lived in Murakowski’s residence hall, “manifested 
both verbally and by her appearance abject terror of Murakowski 
and fear for her safety to the point that she had to change her 
academic schedule.  She also sought counseling.  The brother of a 
female student complained to University police about 
Murakowski’s essays.”226  Another parent also complained.227  But 
these community and student concerns were not enough for the 
court: “Although complete chaos is not required, something more 
than distraction or discomfiture created by the speech is 
needed.”228  The court determined that the university did not 
present evidence “which reasonably led it to forecast material 
interference with campus education and activities.”229  And the 
university also did not show that the student’s writings “were 
intentionally aimed at disrupting the college environment and 
actually materially did so in a concrete fashion.”230 
The speech itself must cause or be reasonably likely to cause a 
substantial and material disruption within the school environment, 
not simply an inconvenience or worry for school officials.  
Therefore, Tatro’s Facebook posts simply do not meet this 
standard.  They did not create a substantial disruption.  Classes did 
not stop.  Teachers continued to teach.  The facts do not indicate 
any sort of wide-ranging concern among the student body.  One 
 
 224. Murakowski v. Univ. of Del., 575 F. Supp. 2d 571, 592 (D. Del. 2008). 
 225. Id. at 576–78.  Murakowski wrote, among other things, a how-to guide 
depicting how he would go about kidnapping, raping, torturing, killing, and then 
disposing of women’s bodies.  Id. 
 226. Id. at 591. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 592. 
 230. Id. 
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student came forward to complain about the posting, which Tatro 
had not directed at the school in any way.  Police determined there 
was not a real threat.  Had the university not overreacted to the 
posts, none of the disruption would have happened.  It is 
disingenuous, circular logic to lay blame for any disruption on the 
student speech, when it was the reaction to the student speech that 
caused the disruption. 
VII.  TRUE-THREAT STANDARD MORE APPLICABLE THAN TINKER IN 
EVALUATING TATRO 
A. Adult Speech Should Be Evaluated Under a Higher Standard 
The University of Minnesota’s discipline of Tatro was 
inappropriate under the Tinker standard.  As an attempt to punish 
Tatro for the content of her speech, the university’s disciplinary 
measures were content-based speech restrictions, which are 
protected under the First Amendment unless an exception applies.  
As discussed, Tinker and the Court’s subsequent decisions define an 
exception for K-12 students who are on campus or at a school 
event, and whose speech is likely to cause a material and substantial 
disruption, is lewd or offensive, or is in opposition to the school’s 
educational mission.  Tatro v. University of Minnesota does not fall 
within these exceptions. 
A more appropriate First Amendment exception from which 
to analyze Tatro’s speech is the “true-threat” doctrine.  While the 
First Amendment protects nearly all adult speech, it does not 
provide an absolute shield.  One exception, for instance, is for a 
true threat.  Speech that constitutes a “true threat” is not entitled to 
First Amendment protection under the Court’s holding in the 1969 
case of Watts v. United States.231  Thirty-four years later, in Virginia v. 
Black, the Court held that “‘true threats’ . . . encompass those 
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
 
 231. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).  In 1966, a protestor on the Washington Monument 
grounds, in opposition to the draft, said that he wanted to get his sights on the 
President of the United States if the government forced him to carry a rifle.  Id. at 
706.  He was charged and convicted for violating a federal law that prohibited 
threats against the president.  Id.  But the Court found that his words amounted to 
political hyperbole and were not true threats within the statutory meaning.  Id. at 
708.  The Court held that speech loses the protection of the First Amendment 
when the government proves that it constitutes a “true ‘threat.’”  Id. 
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particular individual or group of individuals.”232 
B. True Threats Must be Understood by Reasonable Person as Expressing 
Violent Intent 
 While Watts made it clear that true threats are not protected 
speech, the Court arguably has not adopted a clear standard to 
determine when caustic or violent speech is a true threat.233  The 
question that courts have struggled with is determining the level of 
intent necessary for the speech to be considered a true threat.  
Although Black suggests a subjective standard of intent, the federal 
circuit courts have split as to what speech constitutes a true threat.  
As First Amendment scholar David Hudson notes, some courts have 
determined that a speaker must intend to threaten someone.234  
“This doesn’t mean that the speaker must actually intend to carry 
out the threat.  It does mean, however, that the speaker must 
subjectively intend that his or her comments be interpreted as a 
true threat.”235  But other courts have required only that the 
speaker “knowingly intended” to communicate to someone.236  
“These courts do not require that it be proven that the speaker 
subjectively intended to threaten someone.  Rather, they focus on 
whether there was an intent to communicate and whether an 
objective or reasonable recipient would regard it as a serious 
expression of harm.”237 
 
 232. 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (internal citation omitted).  In Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion, she also wrote that a “prohibition on true threats 
protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear 
engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur.”  Id. at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alteration in original).  
 233. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, 
and Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1294 (2005) (analyzing several layers 
of conflicting messages in Virginia v. Black); Paul T. Crane, Note, ‘True Threats’ and 
the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1244–48 (2006) (discussing how lower courts 
have interpreted true threats under Virginia v. Black). 
 234. David L. Hudson Jr., True Threats, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (June 1, 
2010), http://www.firstamendmentcentral.org/Speech/personal/topic.aspx?topic 
=true_threats. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. 
 237. Id.  The Ninth Circuit applied the subjective-intent test in United States v. 
Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 633 (9th Cir. 2005), while the Fifth Circuit applied the 
objective recipient test in Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, 393 F.3d 608, 616 
(5th Cir. 2004).  In addition, in United States v. Dinwiddie the Eighth Circuit 
identified five factors to analyze in determining whether speech is a true threat.  
76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996).  The Dinwiddie factors are (1) “whether the threat 
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In the Eighth Circuit, the test for distinguishing a true threat 
from constitutionally protected speech is whether an objectively 
reasonable recipient would interpret the threat “as a serious 
expression of an intent to harm or cause injury to another.”238  This 
rule stems from the 2002 case Doe v. Pulaski County Special School 
District where the Eighth Circuit ruled that a student’s violent, off-
campus speech was not protected.239  In Pulaski, an eighth grade 
student, “J.M.,” was expelled for writing two letters describing how 
he planned to rape and murder a classmate who had broken up 
with him.240  He kept the letters at home and never delivered them 
to his ex-girlfriend, but she found out about them nonetheless.241  
The court ruled that J.M.’s free-speech rights were not violated 
because the letters were true threats.  The court concluded that 
“J.M. intended to communicate the letter and is therefore 
accountable if a reasonable recipient would have viewed the letter 
as a threat.”242  This element “is satisfied if the speaker 
communicates the statement to the object of the purported threat 
or to a third party.”243 
Pulaski is not the only instance of a court applying a true-threat 
analysis to school speech that is perceived as threatening.244  In 
Hannibal, the Eighth Circuit held that a high school student’s 
instant messages about shooting his classmates were not protected 
 
was conditional,” (2) the reaction of the listeners, (3) “whether the threat was 
communicated directly to its victim,” (4) “whether the maker of the threat had 
made similar statements to the victim in the past,” and (5) “whether the victim had 
reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in 
violence.”  Id. 
 238. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc). 
 239. Id. at 619; see also Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 958, 963–64 (8th Cir. 
2008) (applying Pulaski and a true-threat analysis in holding that a decision to 
place a high school student who wrote a “fantasy murder-suicide” in protective 
custody did not violate his First Amendment rights). 
 240. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 619. 
 241. Id. at 619–20. 
 242. Id. at 624. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See, e.g., Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371 
(9th Cir. 1996).  The court upheld, on true-threat grounds, the discipline of a 
high school student who said she would shoot a school counselor, declining to 
apply Tinker because threatening conduct is not protected, regardless of whether 
or not it happened at school.  Id.  Other courts have declined to apply a true-
threat analysis.  See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d. 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 
2007) (applying Tinker to analyze a student’s speech and rejecting Pulaski, stating 
that “school officials have significantly broader authority to sanction student 
speech” than the true-threat standard allows). 
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under Tinker or a true-threat standard.245  The court found that the 
speech constituted a true threat because (1) the teen intentionally 
communicated his threats to a third party; (2) his speech could be 
reasonably understood as a true threat (taken in the context of his 
depression, access to weapons, and statement that he wanted 
Hannibal “to be known for something”); and (3) his statements 
were sufficiently serious.246 
Under both the subjective and objective tests—which analyze 
the speaker’s intent—the speech must be understood by a 
reasonable person as expressing an intent to commit violence in 
order to qualify as a true threat.247  Therefore, the belief that there 
is an actual threat must be reasonable within the context it was 
made. 
C. Tatro’s Speech Does Not Qualify as a True Threat 
Although other courts have employed a true-threat analysis, 
Tatro sidestepped it.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that 
most courts have held that “student expression need not reach the 
true-threat threshold before a public school may take appropriate 
disciplinary action in the interest of protecting the work and safety 
of its community.”248  This rule acknowledges that it is possible for 
speech to cause a substantial disruption under Tinker, but not rise 
to the level of a true threat.  The fact that the true-threat doctrine 
presents a higher barrier to restricting speech is exactly why it 
should provide the basis for analyzing university speech.  Applying 
a true-threat analysis to the speech of an adult student at a public 
university is more appropriate than applying Tinker, particularly 
when the speech in question was off campus. 
Arguably, the court did not undertake a true-threat analysis 
because Tatro’s speech clearly did not constitute a true threat.  
While the true-threat doctrine would have been a better starting 
point for the court’s analysis of her speech, Tatro nevertheless 
should not have been disciplined under it.  In Murakowski v. 
University of Delaware, for instance, even where a university student 
posted graphic and violent acts—including rape, kidnap, and 
murder—on a web site he created on the school’s server, a court 
 
 245. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 765–66 (8th 
Cir. 2011); see id. at 762–64.  
 246. Id. at 762–64. 
 247. See State v. Cook, 947 A.2d 307, 315 (Conn. 2008). 
 248. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
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held that his acts did not amount to true threats.249  The court 
found that while the student’s comments “clearly impl[y] an 
interest in raping and/or murdering women,” they did not 
“constitute a true threat.”250  Although many of his postings were 
directed to women as a whole, they were not directed at “specific 
individuals, a particular group[,] or even to women on the 
University’s campus.”251  Furthermore, while at least one female 
student (who lived in the same dormitory) was frightened, others 
did not take the student’s rants seriously, and a doctor found that 
while they were indeed offensive, they did not pose a threat.252 
Similarly, the University of Minnesota police determined that 
Tatro’s Facebook posts about wanting to stab a “certain someone” 
and having a “Death List” were not criminal.253  But in bypassing 
the issue, the court nullified the findings of the police 
investigation.  While one faculty member was frightened by the 
posts, there was no rational basis for this fear.  Tatro had neither a 
propensity for nor a history of violence.  She did not identify whom 
she wanted to harm in the posts, for which the audience was her 
friends and family who presumably understood her dark sense of 
humor.  There was no context that would lead a reasonable person 
to believe that there was a serious basis for the conclusion that the 
online posts were truly threatening. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
A. Offensive Speech is Protected Speech 
Tatro’s posts on Facebook were inappropriate, in bad taste, 
and most certainly offended the families who had bequeathed 
cadavers to the University of Minnesota’s mortuary-science 
program.  But the posts, however offensive, were protected speech.  
A hallmark of the First Amendment is that speech does not lose its 
protection merely for offense and discomfiture.  The standard 
remains that all speech is protected unless its content falls within 
an exception that removes free-speech safeguards.  And in this 
case, Tatro’s Facebook posts did not fall within such an exception.  
They were neither a true threat nor a substantial disruption to the 
 
 249. 575 F. Supp. 2d 571, 590–91 (D. Del. 2008).  
 250. Id. at 590. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 580, 582, 591. 
 253. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 816, 822. 
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university’s classes or other educational endeavors.  The basis, 
therefore, used by the Minnesota Court of Appeals to uphold the 
university’s sanctioning is an unconstitutional extension of 
exceptions to the First Amendment. 
Tatro argued that the Facebook posts, “when read in context, 
were obviously literary expression, intended to be satirical, vent 
emotion, and incorporate popular culture references.”254  This is a 
highly reasonable explanation, particularly given the fact that she 
was a mortuary-science student with an acknowledged “sarcastic” 
and “morbid sense of humor.”255  She had never handled or used a 
trocar before posting on Facebook about this instrument.256  The 
teacher of the lab class in which a trocar would be used said she 
had never seen Tatro do or say anything threatening, considered 
her a good student, and did not ask her for an explanation about 
the Facebook posts.257  The posts did not amount to a “serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence”258 as 
required under the true-threat doctrine.  
It appears, based on the unsavory facts of this case, that the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals was looking for a way to uphold 
Tatro’s discipline.  Since it could not do so using the standard 
appropriate for adult speech, the true-threat standard, it simply 
rejected its use.  The court instead chose a standard set forth by 
Tinker and its progeny, which traditionally has been applied to far 
younger students.   
The Tinker standard simply does not fit.  First, it ignores the 
crucial difference between the relatively limited First Amendment 
rights of high school students and the more vigorous rights of 
college students.  In addition, online speech is off-campus speech, 
particularly when the nexus between the speech and the campus is 
attenuated, and the speech contains no direct threats aimed at the 
school.  Furthermore, critically, her speech did not create a 
material and substantial disruption on campus.  There may have 
been a low-level concern on campus, but nothing that caused a 
disruption of school activities that would rise to the level required 
under Tinker.  Finally, the university’s attempt to bolster its 
 
 254. Id. at 817. 
 255. Relator’s Brief and Addendum at 6, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 
811 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (No. A10-1440), 2010 WL 7131428, at *6. 
 256. Id. at 5. 
 257. Id. at 7. 
 258. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003). 
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disruption claim by pointing to the phone calls it received from 
alumni and donors does not hold up.  This “disruption” came as a 
result of media reports released after campus officials initially 
overreacted and banned Tatro from campus.  The university 
should not be allowed to bootstrap the disruption caused by its own 
overreaction to the speech onto the initial speech itself.  
Staunching negative publicity, clearly an underlying concern in this 
case, is not a legitimate reason to impinge on free-speech rights. 
B. Implications of Tatro for Student Speech 
By blithely extending the Tinker standard that governs on-
campus junior high and high school speech to off-campus 
university speech, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has watered 
down First Amendment protections for college students.  Yet the 
off-campus speech of college students in particular should be held 
to the same standards as that of adults in any other setting.  
Furthermore, by determining that Tatro’s off-campus posts caused 
a substantial disruption on campus, the appeals court came 
dangerously close to establishing a zero-tolerance policy for jokes 
that refer to violent behavior.  Judge Bjorkman acknowledged as 
much, noting that it did not matter if Tatro intended the language 
to be threatening: 
Whether or not Tatro intended her posts to be satire or 
mere venting does not diminish the university’s 
substantial interest in protecting the safety of its students 
and faculty and addressing potentially threatening 
conduct.  Indeed, the realities of our time require that 
our schools and universities be vigilant in watching for 
and responding to student behavior that indicates a 
potential for violence.259 
But this distinction does matter.  Common sense should still 
count.  While there is a “fine line between ill-advised social media 
rants and truly threatening posts, . . . there’s a mini-trend in court 
to collapse the two categories.”260  One reason that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has required a demanding showing for speech to 
be deemed a true threat is that plenty of “ambiguous language—or 
even language that says nothing threatening on the surface—could 
 
 259. Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 816–17. 
 260. Eric Goldman, Mortuary Sciences College Student Disciplined for Threatening 
Facebook Posts—Tatro v. University of Minnesota, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 
12, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/07/mortuary_scienc.htm.  
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be seen as threatening by some readers or listeners.”261  Simply 
because someone believes language to be threatening does not 
reasonably make it so. 
The court’s discussion above seemingly invites an examination 
of Tatro’s conduct as a true threat.  But instead, the court applied 
Tinker, and in doing so, lowered the threshold for speech to cause a 
substantial disruption to classroom activities.  The court’s 
deference essentially granted carte blanche authority to university 
officials to censor broad swaths of online postings that they 
determine to be a substantial disruption. 
Noted First Amendment scholar and UCLA law professor 
Eugene Volokh astutely expressed concern that under the logic 
espoused by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, “overly cautious 
university police” could investigate blog posts that simply criticize 
faculty or express support for students to be allowed to carry 
concealed weapons.262  In addition, “a student’s allegedly racist, 
sexist, anti-gay, anti-Muslim, anti-Christian, anti-Israel, etc. posts 
could easily create a ‘substantial disruption’ by alienating donors, 
prospective clients, and the like.”263  Indeed, if the test for 
substantial disruption is whether university donors are unhappy, 
this end-run around the First Amendment would greatly chill 
college students’ free speech.  Universities could use this 
justification to silence students’ speech that alienates donors or 
other boosters, regardless of actual threats or resulting disruption. 
C. Minnesota Supreme Court Should Overturn Tatro 
Tatro is a rare example of a published appellate opinion that 
addresses the off-campus speech rights of college students.  If left 
to stand, the decision is likely to have a threefold negative impact 
on student speech—in its application of Tinker to a university, its 
restriction of online speech, and its relaxed view of what constitutes 
a substantial disruption that Tinker requires.  The Tatro decision 
should not be allowed to become binding precedent in Minnesota 
 
 261. Eugene Volokh, Court Upholds Discipline of University Student Based on 
Speech, Citing Tinker, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 11, 2011 6:17 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2011/07/11/court-upholds-discipline-of-university-student-
based-on-speech-citing-tinker/. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id.  Volokh suggests that if the Minnesota Court of Appeals had chosen to 
uphold Tatro’s discipline on a contract theory—that Tatro had signed away rights 
when she agreed to participate in the program and its conditions on 
confidentiality and respect—the outcome would be perhaps less objectionable.  Id. 
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and persuasive jurisprudence elsewhere. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court should overrule the appellate 
court, on the grounds that it misapplied the Tinker standard.  It 
should not further dilute Tinker by extending it to off-campus, 
online, college speech.  The state’s highest court instead should 
analyze Tatro’s speech under the more proper framework for 
restricting the content of adult speech—the true-threat doctrine.  
And under that doctrine, Tatro’s speech should be afforded 
protection under the First Amendment because it does not rise to 
the level of a true threat. 
Tatro exemplifies precisely the type of speech that must be 
protected.  It was in poor taste and offensive—but that has never 
been the test for speech that can be sanctioned.  Indeed, it is the 
unpopular statements that need the most protection.  The 
sanctioning of Tatro’s speech was not the result of a material and 
substantial disruption of on-campus educational activities.  Rather, 
it was brought on by school administrators’ “mere desire to avoid 
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint.”264  Furthermore, Tatro’s Facebook posts 
were made away from school and not directed at anyone at the 
university.  As speech continues to move online, educators will 
continue to grapple with what falls under their authority and is 
perceived as on-campus speech, and what does not.  And while the 
line undoubtedly needs to be drawn to distinguish when students’ 
cyberspeech may become subject to school restrictions, the speech 
at issue here clearly falls on the protected side of that line. 
 
 
 264. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
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